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FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AND THE
PRODUCTION OF CORPORATE DOCUMENTS
SHAUNA J. SULLIVANt
As the power and predominance of corporations and other collec-
tive entities has grown over the past one hundred years,' courts have
struggled to formulate an effective procedure for investigating the
crimes of collective entities that will not violate the rights of the individ-
uals acting within those organizations.2 Although the courts have con-
sistently held that corporations and other collective entities are not con-
sidered "persons" for fifth amendment purposes, and therefore are not
entitled to the amendment's protections,' the individuals acting within
the organizations do retain their constitutional rights. In addition, al-
though collective entities are capable of committing crimes and being
punished for them, in reality the individuals within those entities are
actually committing the crimes. The disparity between the rights of col-
lective entities and the individuals acting within them creates difficulties
in formulating proper procedures for the investigation of corporate
crime.4 This difficulty is demonstrated by the current split in opinion
t A.B. 1980, Cornell University; M.A. 1982, University of California, Santa Bar-
bara; J.D. Candidate 1987, University of Pennsylvania.
1 See generally E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONrROL, CORPORATE POWER (1981)
(discussing the centralization of corporate power in the twentieth century and examin-
ing conflicts between corporate power and corporate responsibility).
2 See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). In Hale, the Supreme Court
recognized that the individuals within a corporation retain their constitutional rights,
including the right to refuse to incriminate themselves, but the Court assumed that the
act of incorporation prevented a corporation from using individual rights to preclude an
investigation of itself. See id. at 74-76.
3 See id. at 75. For a more contemporary formulation of this rule, see Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90
(1974); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir.
1985); see also Fifth Amendment Limitations on Compelled Production of Evidence,
22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 559, 560 (1984) [hereinafter Fifih Amendment Limitations]
(noting that collective entities cannot claim the privilege against self-incrimination);
Comment, United States v. Doe: Fifth Amendment Protection From the Compulsory
Production of Documents, 8 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 293, 305-06 (1984) (describing
circumstances that preclude the use of the fifth amendment).
4 See generally Coffle, "No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized
(747)
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between the Second and Third Circuits as to whether the custodian of
corporate documents in a one-person corporation can be compelled to
produce those documents in response to a subpoena duces tecum. These
circuits disagree over how the 1984 United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in United States v. Doe5 affects this issue.
In Doe, the Supreme Court held that a sole proprietor's act of
producing business records is testimonial in nature and therefore can
not be compelled without violating the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.' By admitting possession of the documents and producing them in
response to a subpoena, the defendant essentially would have authenti-
cated the records. Thus, the Court concluded that to compel him to
produce the papers would be to compel him to testify and possibly to
incriminate himself.
7
The Second and Third Circuits disagree about whether Doe's act
of production doctrine extends protection to the document custodian of
a one-person corporation.$ A one-person corporation differs from a sole
proprietorship because it has been formally incorporated and therefore
enjoys the benefits of incorporation, such as limited liability and perpet-
ual existence. The one-person corporation presents a particularly diffi-
cult analytical challenge for courts because the individual and the or-
ganization are legally and formally distinct, but the actions of the
businessperson and the business are the same. What level of constitu-
tional protection is appropriate when the business is accused of mis-
deeds that clearly must have been perpetrated by the businessperson?
In In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown),9 the Third Circuit con-
cluded that, under the act of production doctrine set forth in Doe, the
fifth amendment protects the custodian of corporate documents in a
one-person corporation from compelled production of documents that
may be self-incriminating.1 ° The Second Circuit analyzed the problem
differently in In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum,I hold-
ing that Doe protects only sole proprietorships.1 2 Thus, the Second Cir-
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386 (1981)
(exploring the relationship of the individual acting within the corporation to the organi-
zation in the context of corporate crime and punishment).
a 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
C See id. at 612.
7 See id. The Doe Court's analysis will be hereinafter referred to as the "act of
production" doctrine.
8 Compare In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52 (2d
Cir. 1985) with In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985) (en
banc).
768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc).
1o See id. at 528.
769 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1985).
See id. at 58.
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cuit denied the privilege against self-incrimination to the custodian of
corporate documents, regardless of the size of the corporation.
These divergent opinions reflect a long-standing confusion about
the appropriate way to analyze claims for fifth amendment protection
when business documents are subpoenaed. As collective entities have
become more powerful and business crime has increased, courts have
been forced to struggle to define the boundaries of the privilege against
self-incrimination. Certain basic policy concerns influence the analysis:
safeguarding privacy, preventing corporations from using the fifth
amendment to shield their wrongdoings, and protecting the individuals
within collective entities from compelled self-incrimination. The con-
flicts between these policy interests have contributed to the confusing
doctrine in this area.
Part I of this Comment will trace the major lines of analysis that
the courts have used when faced with fifth amendment challenges to a
subpoena for collective entities' documents. Part II will discuss how
these lines of analysis have led to the current confusion and will ana-
lyze the circuit courts' conflicting decisions. Part III proposes a model
for a more coherent analysis of this problem that would lead to more
uniform and realistic results.
I. THE CENTRAL TENSIONS
Over the past century, courts have been unable to resolve the ten-
sions inherent in situations in which the prosecution of corporate
wrongdoing may infringe on individual rights. They have not found a
consistent way of framing the issue. Rather, the courts have used three
major approaches to determine whether fifth amendment protection is
available to the custodian of a collective entity's documents.
First, courts have looked to the nature of the document to deter-
mine if the document merits protection. Under this content rule,"3 the
court examines whether the document contains an individual's inten-
tions and beliefs. The rule springs from a concern about preserving
individual privacy. Second, courts have based their decisions on
whether the owner of the document is entitled to fifth amendment pro-
tection.14 Because corporations are not entitled to fifth amendment pro-
tection,15 subpoenaed corporate documents must always be produced
under this analysis. In this way, corporations are prevented from using
13 See infra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
13 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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the rights of individuals as a shield from prosecution. 6 Finally, courts
have focused on the testimonial nature of the response to a subpoena.11
Under this analysis, the court considers whether the act of producing
the document constitutes testimony about the existence, possession, or
authenticity of self-incriminating documents.""
To some extent, these three lines of analysis represent an evolution
in the law: the content rule developed into an inquiry into ownership of
documents, which in turn was replaced by the act of production doc-
trine.' 9 But the concerns underlying all three analyses remain vital.
Courts hint at, without expressly articulating, an interest in protecting
individuals' privacy, preventing corporate wrongdoers from using indi-
viduals' rights as a shield, and determining whether individuals are im-
plicated by the act of producing corporate documents.20 One analysis
appears to replace the other, but in effect the lines of analysis are coex-
istent, not merely chronological. Since their coexistence is not expressly
articulated in the opinions, the confusion in this area goes beyond the
difficult constitutional question. In sum, the patchwork of concerns that
surround the analysis exacerbates the central difficulty of analyzing
what constitutional rights apply to individuals acting within
organizations.
A. Which Documents Should Be Protected?
In determining which documents should be protected under the
fifth amendment, early twentieth century cases focused on the nature of
the documents subpoenaed. For example, in Boyd v. United States,
21
the Supreme Court based its analysis on a property theory. The Court
found that business records could not be subpoenaed because they were
the owner's private papers.2 The Court held that whenever a subpoena
requires the production of a person's private property for use against
a But see Comment, Organizational Papers and the Privilege Against Self-In-
crimination, 99 HARV. L. REv. 640, 648 (1986) ("Because the fifth amendment is
concerned with the integrity of the process of law enforcement, its effect on the success
of prosecutions should be relatively unimportant.").
17 See infra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
18 See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984).
19 See Note, Criminal Procedure-Sole Shareholder's Privilege Against Self-In-
crimination in Producing Corporate Documents-In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown),
768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc), 59 TEMPLE L.Q. 219, 219-20 (1986).
20 These concerns are all present in the court's analysis in In re Two Grand Jury
Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1985).
21 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (holding that compelled production of an invoice in a
customs violation case violated the fourth and fifth amendments).
22 See id. at 630.
[Vol. 135:747
FIFTH AMENDMENT AND CORPORATE DOCUMENTS
her in a criminal case, the fifth amendment is violated.2" The content
rule articulated in Boyd reflected a desire to protect privacy. The Boyd
court viewed the compelled production of personal papers as the
equivalent of forcing testimony from an individual because the content
of the papers was private.24
Although Boyd's rationale might have been extended to protect
corporate documents, in Hale v. Henkel2" the Court excluded docu-
ments owned by corporations from the constitutional protection ac-
corded the private papers of individuals. Hale refused to produce in-
criminatory business documents in an antitrust investigation. The Hale
Court found that when a group of businesspersons choose to incorpo-
rate their organization, they waive certain rights. A corporation is es-
sentially a creature of the state, and part of its grant to exist includes
the visitatorial powers of the state that are built into the charter.
26
Thus, the Hale and Boyd decisions created a two-part scheme of analy-
sis, in which corporate documents were clearly precluded from fifth
amendment protection, and non-corporate private papers, which in-
cluded business records owned by individuals, were always accorded
fifth amendment protection.27 The nature of the papers determined
whether the privilege against self incrimination applied in a given case.
This analysis was useful in its predictability, but it diluted the
notion that the content of the document should determine the applica-
bility of fifth amendment protection. By establishing two discrete types
of documents, corporate and private, the Court moved from a situation-
sensitive analysis of content to a broad categorization that precluded
further examination. Perhaps more importantly, the underlying inquiry
shifted to the identity of the owner of the papers. Thus, the implicit
rationale emerged that the businessperson's act of incorporation waived
fifth amendment rights for corporate documents.2 8
In 1944, the Court further narrowed the scope of fifth amendment
2 See id. at 638; see also Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the
Subpoena Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 HARv. L. REv.
683, 684 (1982) ("Th[e] property oriented view of the fifth amendment [in Boyd] im-
plied that courts were to focus on the nature of the evidence sought, not the process by
which it was to be obtained.").
24 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633; Comment, supra note 3, at 296.
25 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
26 See id. at 74-75.
17 See Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents-Cutting Fisher's
Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. REV. 439, 449 (1984); see also Grant v. United States, 227
U.S. 74, 80 (1913) (Corporate documents are outside fifth amendment protection.);
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384 (1911) (A corporate custodian may not
claim the privilege against self-incrimination when required to produce corporate docu-
ments, even though the documents might incriminate her personally.).
8 See Hale, 201 U.S. at 74-75.
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protection in United States v. White.29 In White, a union official
claimed that the privilege against self-incrimination protected him from
producing union documents. The Court abandoned the absolute corpo-
rate/private categories when it acknowledged that the fear that the
privilege would be used to cover up corporate crime was the real mo-
tivator behind denying its protection to corporate documents."0 The
White Court examined a number of factors to determine whether a col-
lective entity that is not under corporate charter is more like a corpora-
tion than an individual doing business. The factors included whether
the organization operated under a formal constitution, whether it held
itself out to third parties as a separate entity, and whether it kept books
that were distinct from the personal records of the members.3" Using
these, the Court concluded that neither labor unions nor their repre-
sentatives acting in their official capacity could invoke the personal
privilege against self-incrimination.82
Although the White Court considered the nature of the entity
claiming the privilege, its underlying approach was similar to that in
Boyd and Hale. The Court examined the nature of the entity primarily
as a means of identifying the nature of the document: whether a docu-
ment was essentially "corporate" or "personal" still determined
whether the fifth amendment afforded protection to the custodian of the
document. But the Boyd content rule essentially had become an inquiry
into ownership of the documents, and the issue of what the document
contained became subordinate to the question of the nature of the
owner.
B. Who Should Be Protected?
The second line of analysis courts have employed focuses on
2-9 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
30 See id. at 700. The concerns that emerged in White continue to trouble courts
today and are vital components in the debate over whether the custodian of the corpo-
rate documents of a solely owned corporation may invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination. See, e.g., In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52,
56-57 (2d Cir. 1985) ("'Were the cloak of the privilege to be thrown around these
impersonal records and documents, effective enforcement of many federal and state laws
would be impossible.' ") (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944));
In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 529 (3d Cir. 1985) ("The dissent's
raising the spectre of two corporations avoiding prosecution . . . by virtue of a 'de
facto' corporate privilege is . . . unrealistic . . ").
31 See White, 322 U.S. at 701-02. Additional factors included whether the organi-
zation engaged in a broad scope of activities in which it was recognized as an indepen-
dent entity, and whether the members had the right to inspect the union books and
records for their private purposes. See id.
32 See id. at 701.
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whether the person seeking fifth amendment protection for business
records is entitled to the privilege. The concern with the nature of the
owner of the document implicit in White became express doctrine in
Bellis v. United States.'3 The Bellis Court established a "bright line"
test barring certain types of entities from fifth amendment protection. If
an entity fell into this category, it would not be afforded fifth amend-
ment protection whether it was a corporation or not.34 Thus, the Court
required a three-person partnership to produce its business records in
response to a subpoena. 5
The Court, following the White analysis, examined certain quali-
ties of the partnership in order to determine whether it was a collective
entity. The partnership held itself out to third parties as a separate
entity, kept its books independent from each partner's individual books,
and provided all of its members access to the records. 6 Based on these
facts, the Court found that the partnership was essentially like a corpo-
ration because it had "an established institutional identity independent
of its individual partners137 and therefore was not entitled to fifth
amendment protection. 8
Unlike the Court in White, the Bellis Court's true concern was
with who should be protected by the fifth amendment, not which docu-
ments should be protected. The White examination of who owned the
documents developed in Bellis into a more explicit concern with who
had the right to protection from self-incrimination. The Bellis Court
emphasized the absolute bar to corporate fifth amendment rights and
stated:
In view of the inescapable fact that an artificial entity
can only act to produce its records through its individual of-
ficers or agents, recognition of the individual's claim. of privi-
lege with respect to the financial records of the organization
would substantially undermine the unchallenged rule that
the organization itself is not entitled to claim any Fifth
Amendment privilege, and largely frustrate legitimate gov-
ernmental regulation of such organizations."'
33 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
"' Although the Court was aware of the nature of the documents themselves, see
id. at 86 ("petitioner's personal privilege [does] not extend to the partnership's financial
books and records") this did not appear to be central to its analysis.
" See id. at 95.
36 See id. at 96-99.
37 Id. at 95.
" See id.
39 Id. at 90.
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Thus, the Court concluded that the representative cannot be protected
if the organization is not protected. 0 The inquiry had shifted from
ownership to the identity of the person or entity claiming protection.
The partnership in Bellis was not a person, so it was not entitled to
fifth amendment protection. The White Court's secondary concern that
collective entities must be prevented from using fifth amendment rights
to shield their wrongs from investigation crystallized as the central con-
cern in the preclusive Bellis opinion.
The Court's analysis in White and Bellis implies that a spectrum
of entities exists: individuals are at one end and large publicly held
corporations at the other, with sole proprietorships, partnerships, un-
ions, solely owned corporations, and closely held corporations spanning
the difference. By considering the factors that make an entity more or
less like a corporation, the Bellis and White opinions create the impres-
sion that the Court was attempting to place the organizations involved
on that spectrum by using an analysis sensitive to the specific qualities
of the particular entity. This impression, however, is inconsistent with
an examination of the facts of the two cases. Beyond the general char-
acteristics that both are a collection of persons and neither is incorpo-
rated, the large labor union in White bears little resemblance to the
three-person law partnership in Bellis. Yet the Court describes them
both in similar terms, emphasizing that members could inspect books,
that the organizations held themselves out as separate entities, and that
each had a central constitution, or agreement.4
In effect, the Bellis approach denies fifth amendment protection to
any business entity that involves a group of persons. Thus, the "bright
line" rule of Bellis effectively precludes an invocation of the privilege
by an entity member to avoid producing documents owned by the en-
tity. This odd disparity between rhetoric and result highlights the diffi-
culty that the Court has faced in framing this issue. The Court seems
to want to establish a situation-sensitive method of making appropriate
and equitable determinations, but the existing frameworks support only
superficial decisions. A three-person partnership is equated with a
large labor union, which had earlier been equated with a corporation.
Under this type of analysis, the spectrum of collective entities collapses
into two categories. This result does not realistically reflect the multiple
forms of organizations that exist in modern society, nor does it ade-
quately examine the wide range of roles that individuals play within
collective entities.
40 See id.
41 See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 96-99; White, 322 U.S. at 701-02.
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C. What Forms of Testimony Should Be Protected?
The Supreme Court complicated this issue further when it decided
Fisher v. United States.'2 Critics perceived Fisher as a further curtail-
ment of the fifth amendment protection afforded business because it
denied blanket protection for non-corporate business records.' More
significantly, Fisher analyzed fifth amendment claims in the context of
a subpoena for documents in a revolutionary way." The Fisher Court
focused on whether the production of the document would have testi-
monial value rather than whether the document was the type of evi-
dence that ought to be subject to protection or whether the person sub-
poenaed merited protection.' 5 In Fisher, a taxpayer and his attorney
sought protection from a subpoena ordering the attorney to produce the
taxpayer's financial records. The Fisher Court held that, because they
were created voluntarily rather than under compulsion, the contents of
the records were generally not privileged.46 Reasoning that by virtue of
the attorney-client privilege the documents were protected in the hands
of the attorney to the same extent that they would receive protection in
the taxpayer's hands,47 the Court framed the issue as whether the fifth
amendment barred the government from compelling the taxpayer to re-
linquish the records.'8
The Court concluded that the documents were not privileged. It
held that "the Fifth Amendment would not be violated by the fact alone
that the papers on their face might incriminate the taxpayer, for the
privilege protects a person only against being incriminated by his own
compelled testimonial communications.'4 Because the act of producing
the records did not force the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or affirm "the
truth of the contents of the documents sought," 50 it was deemed void of
42 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
4' See, e.g., Fifth Amendment Limitations, supra note 3, at 565; Note, supra note
23, at 683.
"' Fisher constituted a more explicit statement of the shift in fifth amendment
jurisprudence found in cases such as Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), in
which the Court held that an accountant had to produce documents incriminating to his
client because the compulsion did not incriminate the accountant himself. See Note,
supra note 23, at 693 & nn.55 & 58.
'" See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 396.
46 See id. at 409-10.
47 This reasoning was necessitated by the Court's holding that "it [was] not the
taxpayer's Fifth Amendment privilege that would excuse the attorney from production
... because enforcement against [the] taxpayer's lawyer would not 'compel' the tax-
payer to do anything-and certainly would not compel him to 'witness' against him-
self." Id. at 396-97.
4' See id. at 404-05.
49 Id. at 409 (citations omitted).
50 Id. The Court stressed that the fifth amendment would protect the taxpayer
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testimonial value.51 Thus, Fisher substituted the act of production doc-
trine for the content rule, replacing the content rule's concern about
privacy with a concern about compulsion. 2 Under Fisher, the testimo-
nial nature of the response to the subpoena was considered more im-
portant than the nature of the documents. Despite the apparent nar-
rowing of the standard, suggestions that Fisher curtailed fifth
amendment rights were perhaps short-sighted. It is true that the appel-
lant in Fisher would have been protected under the content rule and
was not protected under the act of production doctrine. The-disparity in
result, however, does not reflect an attempt to narrow fifth amendment
protection so much as an attempt to find a test truer to the parameters
of the amendment. Rather than depending on the privacy rationale, the
Fisher Court emphasized that the constitutional privilege precludes
compelled self-incrimination, patterning the standard on the language
of the amendment.58
In United States v. Doe,54 the Supreme Court demonstrated the
protective potential of the act of production doctrine. Doe held that a
sole proprietor may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination to
avoid producing business documents, even though the contents of the
records were not privileged.55 Applying the Fisher rationale, the Court
stated:
Respondent does not contend that he prepared the documents
involuntarily or that the subpoena would force him to re-
state, repeat, or affirm the truth of their contents. The fact
that the records are in respondent's possession is irrelevant to
the determination of whether the creation of the records was
compelled. We therefore hold that the contents of those
records are not privileged.5
Despite this statement, the Court found that given the explicit lower
court finding that producing the documents would involve testimonial
self-incrimination, the fifth amendment protected the sole proprietor
only from "his own compelled testimonial communications," concluding that because
the documents "were not prepared by the taxpayer" (they were prepared by his ac-
countant) "and ... contain[ed] no testimonial declarations by him," the act of produc-
tion did not reach the level or kind of incrimination sought to be proscribed by the
amendment. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
51 See id.
52 See Fifth Amendment Limitations, supra note 3, at 565; Note, supra note 23,
at 683.
Compare Fisher, 425 U.S. at 399-400 with U.S. CONST. amend. V.
" 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
5 See id. at 610-12.
" See id. at 611-12 (citations omitted).
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from producing the documents. 57
In addition to representing heightened concern with finding a test
truer to the parameters of the fifth amendment, Doe and Fisher reveal
the Court's growing concern with deciding fifth amendment questions
in ways responsive to the specific context of the case. Both cases require
a close analysis of the facts to determine whether producing the docu-
ments would risk self-incrimination. This focus on facts is reminiscent
of the situation-sensitive approach adopted by the Court in Boyd. It is
premature, however, to claim that the act of production doctrine has
completely replaced the content rule.5" There is, in fact, some dispute
within the Supreme Court as to whether the content rule and act of
production doctrine are mutually exclusive. In her Doe concurrence,
Justice O'Connor stated that the Fisher analysis implicitly repudiated
the notion that the fifth amendment provides protection for the contents
of documents: "Fisher v. United States. . . sounded the deathknell for
Boyd." 9 In contrast, Justice Marshall, in his partial concurrence, par-
tial dissent, established a hierarchy of analysis. He objected to Justice
O'Connor's assertion that the Boyd doctrine is extinct, and claimed that
"the issue [of] whether the Fifth Amendment protects the contents of
documents was obviated by the Court of Appeals' rulings relating to the
act of production. . . ."60 Thus in Justice Marshall's view a complex
of analyses is available to ascertain whether fifth amendment protection
is pertinent in a given case, but once the act of production requirement
is met, no further inquiry is necessary.
The split between Marshall and O'Connor reflects a crucial ana-
lytic inconsistency. Justice Marshall, motivated by a concern for per-
sonal privacy and a fear that without the content analysis private pa-
pers such as diaries might be subject to subpoena, 1 perceives co-
existent lines of analysis. Justice O'Connor believes that because the
content standard has become obsolete,"2 the methods of analysis are
mutually exclusive. The majority opinion rejects the content rule under
the facts of the case, but it is unclear from its opinion whether the rule
has been utterly repudiated."' Despite the Court's historic denial of
51 Id. at 613-14 & nn.11 & 12.
58 But see Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self-Incrimination and Private Papers
in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REv. 343, 376-77 (1979) (arguing that Fisher and
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), have so weakened the Boyd rationale that
Boyd was "done away with quite off-handedly").
50 Doe, 465 U.S. at 618 (citations omitted) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
60 Id. at 619 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61 See id.
62 See id. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63 Thus, it is unclear after Doe whether the contents of non-business (personal)
papers such as diaries are protected or whether the act of production doctrine is the
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fifth amendment protection to corporations, this analytic ambiguity has
led lawyers to frame arguments based on Doe that attempt to extend
fifth amendment protection to the custodians of documents owned by
solely owned corporations. 4
The Supreme Court appears to consider each thread of analysis to
have continuing value. The content rule is less important than it was
previously, but it has not been expressly overruled. The act of produc-
tion doctrine is clearly important, but the scope of its reach is not yet
defined. At the same time, the bright line test of Bellis has not been
explicitly rejected. Thus, lower courts faced with deciding whether to
recognize the fifth amendment rights of a custodian of a collective en-
tity's documents have interpreted the mixed messages implicit in the
Supreme Court's treatment of the issue in a variety of ways. The dis-
parity between the Second and Third Circuits' treatment of the custo-
dian of the records of a solely owned corporation illustrates this prob-
lem. The result a court reaches depends on how the issue is framed and
which line of analysis is given priority.
II. CRISIS IN ANALYSIS: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
In In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown),65 the Third Circuit held
that the custodian of records for a solely-owned corporation may receive
fifth amendment protection. Brown, the sole owner of an incorporated
accounting firm, claimed that his non-verbal authentication of subpoe-
naed documents could be self-incriminating. 6 The Brown majority fo-
cused on the testimonial nature of the production of the documents.
The court stated:
The government urges that the holding in United States
v. Doe does not control because in Doe the records were
extent of the fifth amendment protection for private papers as well as business papers.
Some lower courts since Doe have held that the contents of personal documents are not
privileged: compelled production of private documents is prohibited only if there are
testimonial aspects to the act of production itself. Other courts have said that personal
records are privileged as to content. Compare In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343, 355-58 (1st
Cir. 1985) and United States v. Klimavicius, 620 F. Supp. 667, 671 (D. Me. 1985)
with In re John Doe No. 462, 745 F.2d 834, 840 (4th Cir. 1984), vacated as moot,
471 U.S. 1001 (1985). Although vacated for mootness, Doe No. 462 is notable for its
explicit rejection of the government's argument that personal records are not privileged
as to content and the insight it provides into how the Fourth Circuit is likely to inter-
pret Doe in the next case that raises the issue. See also In re Grand Jury Investigation,
600 F. Supp. 436, 438 (D. Md. 1984) (implicitly distinguishing between corporate and
private records; the former are privileged only as to the act of production, the latter are
privileged as to content as well as to the act of production).
6 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143, 147 (6th
Cir. 1985) (en banc); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52,
55 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 530 (3d Cir.
1985) (Becker, J., concurring).
.5 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985).
68 See id. at 526.
[Vol. 135:747
FIFTH AMENDMENT AND CORPORATE DOCUMENTS
those of a sole proprietorship, while in this case they belong
to a professional corporation. That argument misses the
whole point of the Court's analysis in Fisher and Doe. Those
cases, consistent with Schmerber v. California, make the sig-
nificant factor, for the privilege against self-incrimination,
neither the nature of the entity which owns documents, nor
the contents of documents, but rather the communicative or
noncommunicative nature of the arguably incriminating dis-
closures sought to be compelled.1
7
The majority clearly considered act of production analysis primary.
Under this view, if fifth amendment protection is available, failure to
meet the content rule guidelines or to fall on the right side of the bright
line of Bellis v. United States is inconsequential .6 The Third Circuit
majority's priority is the protection of the individual acting within the
corporation, 9 seemingly echoing the concerns of the law of equal pro-
tection. For example, the court described the issue before it as follows:
"We must decide whether a person, simply by virtue of his status as a
custodian of a corporation's records, can be compelled to make self-
incriminating disclosures that are testimonial . . . in nature.
7 0
Judge Becker's concurrence quarreled with the majority's reliance
on the act of production doctrine, suggesting that it is a misinterpreta-
tion of Supreme Court doctrine to treat custodians of corporate records
like other record keepers. A correct interpretation, in his view, would
recognize a fifth amendment threshold through which corporate record
custodians simply could not pass. 71 Judge Becker admitted that the cus-
todian herself is protected by the privilege against self-incrimination
from coerced oral testimony, but he maintained that the act of produc-
tion doctrine does not extend to corporate record keepers.72 He sup-
ported this interpretation with the familiar policy rationale that "the
custodian should not be able to shield the collective entity, which has no
fifth amendment privilege, from governmental scrutiny by asserting a
personal right."
'73
Judge Garth's dissent also criticized the way the majority framed
67 Id. at 528 (footnote omitted).
68 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
6" Brown, 768 F.2d at 528-29.
70 Id. at 526.
11 See id. at 530 (Becker, J., concurring).
72 See id.
73 Id.
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the issue: "By treating this as a compelled testimony case rather than a
compelled corporate document production case, the majority has de-
cided a case not before us."' 74 The dissent rejected the majority's appli-
cation of the act of production doctrine, perceiving a need for a differ-
ent sort of analysis when corporate documents are subpoenaed.
According to the dissent, the nature of the document should be the
threshold testy.
7
A similar problem was addressed by the Second Circuit in In re
Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum.7 ' Two grand jury sub-
poenae duces tecum were served at the office of a corporation, one ad-
dressed to the corporation and one addressed to the corporate custodian.
The custodian moved to quash the subpoenae on the ground that the
corporation was essentially a one-person enterprise and if forced to pro-
duce the documents, he might incriminate himself 77 The government
admitted that the subpoenae were aimed at discovering information in-
criminating to the custodian when it named the custodian as the actual
target of the investigation.7
The Second Circuit asserted that a corporate representative cannot
invoke the fifth amendment to protect corporate documents "regardless
of whether they contain information incriminating him or were written
by him, and regardless of whether the corporation is large or small."1
79
The court recognized that an individual may have a fifth amendment
privilege against being compelled to produce corporate documents,80 but
maintained that a corporation is never excused from producing incrimi-
nating documents. If the corporate record keeper would be incriminated
by the act of producing the documents, the corporation must appoint
74 Id. at 532 (Garth, J., dissenting).
75 See id. at 537-39.
76 769 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1985).
77 See id. at 54.
78 See id.
79 Id. at 56; accord In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143
(6th Cir. 1985). The Sixth Circuit views the nature of the entity as the threshold
inquiry:
[S]ince collective entities can act only through officers and agents, the ef-
fect of permitting custodians of partnership and corporate records to avoid
production of such records in reliance on the Fifth Amendment would be
to extend the privilege against self-incrimination to the collective entities.
The custodian of corporate or partnership records acts only in a represen-
tative capacity, not as an individual, and production of the records is not a
testimonial act of the custodians. Production of records communicates
nothing more than the fact that the one producing them is a representative
of the corporation or partnership.
Id. at 148.
8o See Two Subpoenae, 769 F.2d at 59.
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another individual to produce the document."1 This analysis applies to
any corporation of any size. The bright line test of Bellis regarding the
nature of the entity, therefore, is absolutely dispositive of the issue, and
the specific facts regarding the identity of the individual or fictional
person subpoenaed are not to be considered. Thus, the court compelled
production of records incriminating a one-person corporation 2 despite
the fact that the documents would also incriminate the custodian in his
individual capacity. The custodian was, in effect, required to produce
the documents despite the formality of appointing a new corporate rep-
resentative to respond to the subpoena.
The emphasis of the Second Circuit in Two Subpoenae on the na-
ture of the entity grows out of its concern that "the only way to prevent
the corporation from shielding its records from a subpoena is to prevent
individual corporate representatives from exercising such a privilege
with respect to corporate records.""3 The court's interest in individuals
acting within a corporate context seems limited to noting that because
corporations are always composed of people, there is the ever-present
danger that someone will seek fifth amendment protection from produc-
ing documents and thereby thwart criminal investigations.8" The court
justifies the hardship on the custodian by explaining that because busi-
nesspersons choose to incorporate in order to enjoy certain benefits,
they cannot then discard the form in order to shield the corporate
records.8
This opinion illustrates the tension inherent in the recent cases
analyzing the fifth amendment rights of a corporation's custodian of
records. Effective criminal investigations of corporate transgressions are
necessary. Individual rights should not be used as a shield against cor-
porate prosecution. At the same time, the corporate form should not be
used as a spear depriving individuals of their rights as citizens.
The progeny of United States v. Doe"6 reveal a crisis in analysis.
The courts simply do not have an effective framework for deciding
whether the compelled production of documents is protected by the fifth
amendment. Several approaches are currently used: the act of produc-
81 See id.
" The corporation in Two Subpoenae had three shareholders but was "essentially
a one-man operation." Id. at 54.
83 Id. at 56.
84 See id.
85 See id. at 59. The choice to incorporate, however, affects civil rather than crim-
inal liability. Is it appropriate to argue that, by assuming the rights and obligations of
incorporating, the individuals involved sacrifice their individual constitutional rights?
Be 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
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tion doctrine,8 7 a blanket denial of fifth amendment protection when
corporate documents are requested,"' and a threshold inquiry of
whether an individual or a collective entity is required to produce the
documents.8 9 Unlike Justice Marshall's dissent in Doe, which views the
analysis as composed of a complex of considerations, the courts ac-
knowledge the importance of the other lines of analysis, but in the end
rely on only one of the approaches. Their conception is more akin to
Justice O'Connor's Doe concurrence, in which she argues that the act
of production doctrine has replaced the content rule.
Any one of the lines of analysis removed from the others results in
mechanical decisions that do not adequately reflect the variety of forms
of collective entities and, perhaps more importantly, do not respond to
the specific relationship of the individual, the custodian of records, to
the entity. Hence a new model of analysis is necessary if the spirit of
the Fisher v. United States9° and Doe decisions are to be implemented
in the range of cases in which record keepers will attempt to invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination. The courts must either formulate
an approach that recognizes the coexistence of the various lines of anal-
ysis and applies them as a complex of interrelated factors or structure a
hierarchy among the factors.
Because courts will continue to face these problems as corporate
crime escalates,"' the resolution of this "narrow" issue has broad impli-
cations. The fundamental question of how to treat individual actors in
corporate roles has many ramifications and has troubled the court in
other areas.92 The Court does express one possible approach in United
States v. White"3 when it suggests that
individuals, when acting as representatives of a collective
group, cannot be said to be exercising their personal rights
87 See, e.g., Brown, 768 F.2d at 525.
88 See, e.g., Two Subpoenae, 769 F.2d at 52.
89 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.
1985).
90 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
91 See Ross, How Lawless are Big Companies?, 103 FORTUNE 57 (Dec. 1, 1980)
(examining the extent of business crimes in large corporations and the motivations for
white collar crime); see also E. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 259 (Bureaucracies sub-
merge "individual values to the demands . . . of the organization as a whole" and the
people within them commit crimes in the name of the entity which they would not
commit on their own.).
" For example, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978), the Court found a corporation's first amendment rights had been violated. The
decision was not based on whether corporations have first amendment rights, but in
terms of whether the statute in question abridged protected political speech. See id. at
776.
98 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
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and duties nor to be entitled to their purely personal privi-
leges. Rather, they assume the rights, duties and privileges of
the artificial entity or association of which they are agents or
officers and they are bound by its obligations."
Yet, should the assumption of a corporate role, merely accepting em-
ployment with some collective entity, really sever a person from her
constitutional rights? The courts must find a way of protecting individ-
uals' rights even if they are employed by an incorporated entity. If they
do not, the law will effectively separate the large number of citizens
from their constitutional rights when they act within their occupational
roles.
III. PROPOSED MODEL OF ANALYSIS
There are three alternative approaches courts could adopt in
resolving the inconsistent analyses of fifth amendment rights when a
collective entity's papers are subpoenaed. First, courts could use the ex-
isting methods of analysis-the content of documents, the testimonial
nature of producing the documents, and the identity of the person in-
voking the privilege against self-incrimination-as components in a
complex of pertinent factors. Alternatively, courts could designate one
test exclusively, much as the content test used to be dispositive. Finally,
courts could determine that all three lines of analysis are pertinent to
fair application of the privilege and could establish a hierarchy among
them so one analysis acts as a threshold to the others.
A. The Complex of Factors Approach
Courts could adopt the three tests as components of a single test
without ranking the various lines of analysis. This approach would be
flexible enough to adapt to varied circumstances along the spectrum of
collective entities and would also encourage the type of intensive exami-
nation of the entity suggested but not implemented in United States v.
White.9 5 In the case of the record custodian for a solely owned corpora-
tion-the situation splitting the circuits-the court could judge the rela-
tive importance of the status of the record owner and the danger that
the record custodian will be compelled to incriminate herself. The court
would not be required to bar invocation of the privilege simply because
the corporation owns the papers." In the hypothetical case of docu-
9 Id. at 699.
95 322 U.S. 694 (1944); see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
" Cf In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae, 769 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (con-
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ments owned by a closely held corporation and kept by an employee
lacking an ownership interest, the court could consider the identity of
the record keeper, the content of papers in such an intimate business,
and whether the employee recordkeeper is risking incrimination. In re-
fusing to make one test dispositive, the court enables itself to respond
sensitively to a range of fact situations.
The greatest strength of this solution-its flexibility-is also its
most serious weakness. The flexibility of this solution would institu-
tionalize the current inconsistencies between the courts in their treat-
ment of solely owned corporations and would multiply that inconsis-
tency as lawyers litigated new situations involving the wide variety of
collective entities and record keepers who might seek sanctuary within
the privilege. A predictable standard would prevent excessive litigation
on this issue and help achieve consistent results. Although a tension
always exists between predictability and flexibility, there is an unac-
ceptable level of unpredictability inherent in the complex of factors
approach.
Under the complex of factors approach, courts would probably re-
sort to balancing the two central policy issues in these cases: preventing
corporations from using the self-incrimination privilege to shield their
wrongdoing from investigation and protecting individual rights. Where
individual constitutional rights are concerned, balancing tests are highly
problematic.97 Whenever possible, a legal analysis should be con-
structed that does not force courts to resort to balancing effective crimi-
nal prosecutions with individual rights.
B. The "One Test" Approach
Another way to address this problem is to select one line of analy-
sis as dispositive of the issue. This is essentially Justice O'Connor's
approach when she suggests that the establishment of the act of produc-
tion doctrine of Fisher v. United States98 replaces the Boyd v. United
cluding that because it may appoint an agent or uninvolved employee to produce corpo-
rate records, "[tihere simply is no situation in which the fifth amendment would pre-
vent a corporation from producing corporate records").
97 See Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process Rights of Prison-
ers and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV., 482, 573 n.371 (1984)
(discussing the difficulties inherent in applying balancing tests when individual rights
are at stake); Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Lim-
its on Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1511-23 (1975) (criticizing
balancing individual rights); Note, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the
Fourth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127, 1141 (1984) (stating that the use of balancing
tests in fourth amendment cases does not suit constitutional provisions).
98 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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States9 content rule. The primary benefit derived from such an analy-
sis would be a clear statement of legal criteria that would promote more
predictable results.
The Third Circuit's opinion in In re Grand Jury Matter
(Brown)100 exemplifies this mode of analysis. The majority opinion
treats the act of production doctrine of United States v. Doe101 as the
sole factor in deciding fifth amendment issues in production of corpo-
rate document cases. The court focuses on the incriminatory nature of
production and dismisses the content rule as invalid after Fisher."0 2 It
relegates Bellis v. United States 03 to a footnote, explaining that it is
irrelevant because "the holdings in Fisher and Doe render untenable
any suggestion that Bellis would require a custodian to produce docu-
ments where the act of production is both communicative and incrimi-
natory."104 The Brown dissent attacks the majority's methodology 0 5
but presents an alternative that bears an underlying similarity to it.
The dissent treats the identity of the party subpoenaed as the single
relevant fifth amendment inquiry in a production of corporate doc-
uments case. It insists Fisher and Doe are irrelevant when corporate
documents are subpoenaed and states:
[T]he real issue in this case, which the majority fails to ad-
dress, is whether production of the records of a one-man pro-
fessional corporation is to be treated as production by a sole
proprietor-the sort of production involved in Doe-or is to
be treated as production by a representative of a collective,
corporate entity .... 108
This case therefore contains two versions of the "one test" approach.
Either version, the act of production doctrine or the identity inquiry,
follows one line of Supreme Court case law in the area. The majority
depends on Doe, the dissent on Bellis. Both versions suggest predict-
able, workable rules of law. Neither version, however, reflects the situ-
ation sensitive analysis which is at the root of Doe.107
The complex of factors model is too inconsistent, and the one rule
model too one dimensional. Does the hierarchy of tests model have the
99 116 U.S. 616 (1986).
10 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985).
101 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
102 Brown, 768 F.2d at 527.
101 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
10, Brown, 768 F.2d at 528 n.2.
105 See id. at 532 (Garth, J., dissenting).
106 Id.
10 See supra text following note 57.
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capacity to incorporate the desired values of flexibility and situation
specificity without sacrificing clarity, or does it merely embrace the
weaknesses of the other methods?
C. The Hierarchy of Tests
In In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum,10s the Second
Circuit applied a tiered model, which recognized the validity of the act
of production doctrine in the context of corporate documents.1 09 But the
court considered the Bellis inquiry into the identity of the document's
owner a threshold test before the act of production test could be consid-
ered. 10 The court used a model that included the act of production
doctrine, but limited its application in the business context to Doe's
facts."'
1
The result of the Second Circuit's tiered approach in Two Sub-
poenae is the same type of blanket denial to corporate record keepers of
the privilege against self-incrimination found in the Brown dissent. The
method, however, is much closer to the method used, but not articu-
lated, in Doe. The Third Circuit case under review in Doe applied a
tiered approach. 1 2 First, the Doe court of appeals found that the re-
spondent's claim of the fifth amendment privilege was not foreclosed by
Bellis because as a sole proprietor he acted in a personal, not represen-
tative, capacity. 1 3 Second, the court considered whether the contents of
the document were privileged. " Finally, it found that the act produc-
ing the documents would have communicative aspects of its own. 1 Al-
though the Supreme Court did not accept the appellate court's finding
that the records were privileged because they were essentially private
papers,"16 it implicitly accepted the analysis of the status of the record
keeper and explicitly accepted the analysis of the act of production.
11 7
Thus, Doe assumes the tiered analysis without expressly adopting it.
Despite its narrow application in the Second Circuit, the tiered
108 769 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1985).
109 See id. at 57.
110 See id. at 59.
111 See id. at 58.
112 See In re Grand Jury Empaneled March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir.
1982), affd in part & rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605
(1984). Note that the Third Circuit did not use a tiered approach in its post-Doe deci-
sion, Brown, 768 F.2d at 525. See supra notes 54-70 and accompanying text.
11 See Grand Jury, 680 F.2d at 331.
114 See id. at 333.
115 See id. at 336.
"' The Court insisted that the documents were not protected because they were
created voluntarily. See Doe, 465 U.S. at 611-12.
117 See id. at 617.
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analysis model constitutes the best structure for a new legal standard in
the context of applying the fifth amendment to the production of the
documents of a collective entity. By ordering the tests, it provides a
predictable, workable rule of law. In addition, it is complete in its ac-
knowledgement of the values embodied in the three lines of analysis:
privacy, freedom from compulsion, and restriction of the privilege to
natural persons. Attention to content protects privacy. Protection
against self incriminatory oral testimony or testimony through produc-
tion prevents compulsion. Limiting the privilege to natural persons
curbs corporate fifth amendment abuses. Thus, this model serves all of
the policies underlying the production of document cases.
In addition, the tiered model is closest to the fifth amendment it-
self. The amendment reads: "[N]o person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness to himself." '118 Each of the three tests
reflects an aspect of the amendment. The act of production doctrine
protects against "compelled" testimony through response to the sub-
poena. The "nature of the entity" inquiry ensures that protection will
not be given to an entity that, because it is not a "person," is not enti-
tled to such protection. The content rule, to the extent it still has vital-
ity, protects against the production of documents prepared under com-
pulsion or which contain private, testimonial information such as a
diary." 9 The tiered model analysis would be applied as follows: first,
the court would inquire whether the person claiming the privilege is
entitled to it; second, the court would ask whether producing the docu-
ment constitutes compelled testimony; and finally, the court would de-
termine whether a corporate document was created under compulsion
or had the personal, testimonial qualities of a diary. This analysis
would enable the court to protect adequately individual rights without
undermining the investigation of corporate crime. 20 The model can re-
main situation-sensitive if the initial inquiry is whether the party seek-
118 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
119 Although the Powell majority opinion in Doe does not explicitly disavow the
content rule, in her concurrence Justice O'Connor states that the Boyd protection for
private papers had no coherent rationale, and therefore concludes what she found "im-
plicit" in the majority opinion, that "the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no pro-
tection for the contents of private papers of any kind." Doe, 465 U.S. at 618
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Marshall rejects Justice O'Connor's conclusion and
distinguishes between business papers and personal records such as diaries based on
degrees "of concern for privacy interests." Id. at 619 (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
120 Because the majority in Doe gave the act of production doctrine more force
than the content rule, this Comment reorders the tiered model used by the court of
appeals in Doe. See In re Grand Jury Empaneled March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327 (3d
Cir. 1982), affd in part & rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605
(1984)
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ing protection is entitled to the privilege rather than the more narrow
inquiry into the ownership of the documents that the Second Circuit
relied on in Two Subpoenae.
If the Third Circuit had applied this model in the Brown case, it
first would have examined whether the party invoking the privilege
was entitled to it. The subpoena was addressed to Brown himself, or-
dering him to produce self-incriminating documents, and not to an en-
tity that included other individuals capable of response.' Thus, the
court would have found the first tier satisfied.
The Second Circuit would have faced a somewhat more difficult
determination in Two Subpoenae because one subpoena was addressed
to the custodian and the other to the corporation itself.'22 A close exam-
ination of the facts, however, reveals that because only one person was
capable of response-the sole operator of the corporation-and the cus-
todian himself was the subject of investigation, the rights of a natural
person were at stake. Thus, the first tier of the hierarchical approach is
satisfied in Two Subpoenae as it was in Brown. The first tier ensures
that individual rights will not be sacrificed. Because the government
can either find a custodian to produce the documents who would not be
incriminating herself, or grant a custodian who merits protection use
immunity as suggested in Doe,'2 3 this sensitivity to individual rights
does not preclude corporate criminal investigations.
Once the first tier is satisfied, the court must examine whether the
production of the documents, although non-verbal, has testimonial
value. In cases involving sole owners of corporations whose personal
identification with the company is so strong that an investigation of the
company is essentially an investigation of the individual, this tier will
probably be satisfied. Accordingly, it would be satisfied in both Brown
and Two Subpoenae.'24
In cases where the first tier is satisfied, but the second is not, the
court would look to the facts to determine, as a final check, if the con-
tent of the documents were so private as to trigger fifth amendment
concerns or if creation of the documents had been compelled. Only in
extreme cases, such as where a partner in a two-person partnership
was being compelled to produce her partner's diary that was kept on
the business premises, would the court preclude production based on a
121 See Brown, 768 F.2d at 526.
122 See Two Subpoenae, 769 F.2d at 54.
122 See Doe, 465 U.S. at 616 & n.15.
12 Both Brown's production of his accounting firm's records and the majority
shareholder's production in Two Subpoenae would serve to authenticate the records
subpoenaed and would thus have testimonial value, hence satisfying the second tier.
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third tier analysis.
CONCLUSION
There are three analytic approaches represented in production of
document cases. Courts have inquired into the nature of the documents
to ascertain whether the documents themselves merited protection based
on privacy concerns. Courts also have considered whether the owner of
the documents is eligible for fifth amendment protection while fearing
that corporate crimes would be shielded by the rights of corporate em-
ployees. Finally, courts have analyzed the testimonial nature of the pro-
duction of documents although concerned that individuals will be com-
pelled to testify non-verbally.
The courts need to adopt one coherent mode of analysis for apply-
ing fifth amendment protection to the production of corporate docu-
ments. The current state of the law provides little guidance for evaluat-
ing the relative importance of the lines of analysis or the way in which
they interrelate. This is reflected in the existing split between the Sec-
ond and Third Circuits. The split essentially arises out of confusion
about when to apply which analysis.
This Comment proposes a tiered model of analysis. Initially, a
court would examine whether the party claiming fifth amendment pro-
tection is entitled to the right. Then, the court would consider whether
compelled production of the documents constitutes a testimonial act. If
it does not, as a final check, the court would make sure the compulsion
was not an extreme personal privacy intrusion. At all levels the specific
facts would be carefully considered.
This model incorporates the situation sensitivity and close atten-
tion to the fifth amendment that the Court valued in United States v.
Doe. 25 It articulates the methodology implicit in Doe and gives us a
reliable model for analyzing this problematic issue. As society becomes
more complex and individuals act more frequently within collective en-
tities, courts must meet the challenge of forming analyses that will ac-
knowledge individuals' varied relationships to groups and protect indi-
vidual rights without shielding the entities themselves.
125 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
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